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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Until recently, South Carolina has flown the Confederatebattle flag overthe statehouse, now
flown over a confederate monument a few yards away as a result of legislative compromise. nl
Other states defeated in the Civil War have maintained state sponsorship of this symbol, i.e.,
Mississippi and Georgia, through its placement within their state flags. Alabama has finally
discontinued the practice of flying the flag over its statehouse. n2 In response to South Carolina's
conduct, the NAACP has greeted visitors to South Carolina at interstateroadside information centers
by peacefully picketing, leafleting, and informing them about the economic boycott of south
Carolina. They have informed these traveling citizens of the interesting phenomenon of continued
state flying of a symbol routinely exploited associated with racist messagesby the Ku Klux Klan and
European-American Unity and Rights Organization (EURO, led by David Duke of Louisiana).
Members of EURO have also appeared at the rest areas in response to the NAACP presence.
South Carolina's Attorney General, Charlie Condon, now attempts to require priorpennitting
of NAACP and EURO activities at eight rest stops, including seven interstate highway and one
noninterstate, federally funded highway stops. He also seeks declaratolyjudgment that their speech
activities are a "publicnuisance" that may imperil traffic safety and encourage "highway hypnosis."
He requests the state court to find that NAACP and EURO speech violates state and federal law and
highway safety regulations "and conforming state policies" because it may encourage drivers to
avoid the rest areas because NAACP and EURO visitors have expressed political views rather than
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encouraged drivers to rest at rest areas. The South Carolina sign in the informationlarea prohibits
meetings or other group activities and commercial use. Attorney General Condon also seeks to
collect &om the NAACP and EURO the costs of police and public safety services occasioned by
their activities at the Welcome Centers. n3
I.

Does South Carolina's flying a Confederate flag over the statehouse compel speech
repugnant to those who disagree politically with the views shorthanded by the symbol?
A. Is the statehouseflagpole a fraditional or designatedpublicforum?
B. Though arguably ambiguous in political meaning, is the Confederateflag a political
symbol?
C. Does the state 'sjlying the Confederateflag occasion irreparable constitutional injury?

I1

Does the state's requiring a permit of NAACP and EURO visitors to South Carolina
information centers constitute improperprior restraint ofpolitical speech?
A. Is the permit requirement nondiscriminatory? Are other visitors to South Carolina
information centers required to obtain permits before speaking or congregating?
B. Does thepermit requirement containprocedural sajeguardsprotectingspeech? Or does
it allow unfettered discretion by state officials to engage in impermissible viewpoint
discrimination?

111

Is the NAACP's economic boycott of South Carolina protected political speech?

IV

Does the NAACP's and EUROk political speech or expressive conduct violatefederal or
state constitution or law by imperiling trafic safety?
A. Is the NAACP's and EURO's political speech protected under the federal First
Amendment freedom of speech and the South Carolina Constitution's peedom of speech,
petition, and assembly "provisions?
B. Doesfederal orpre-existing, articulatedstate lawpreclude political speech in the South
Carolina resf/information centers?
I. Is a rest area a Yraditional " or "designatedpublic forum ?
2. Is South Carolina 's interest in traffic safety a compelling governmental interest
sufficient to overshadow the injury caused by suppressing political speech?
3. Has South Carolina narrowly tailored its proscription of NAACP and EURO
political speech in the information/rest areas '?
4. May South Carolina charge the NAACP for its police services at the
information/rest areas?
5. Is providing political information inconsistent with traffic safety?
SHORT ANSWERS

1.

Yes. However, speech that offends is the core of the First Amendment. The Statehouse
flagpole is a designated public forum. While the Confederate flag symbolizes racism and

hatred to those who seek its elimination, existing case law does not support that view as a
legal position. While those harmed by racism and hatred believe the state's flying the
Confederate flag irreparably injures them, the courts disagree thus far. The cure for the
state's thirty-eight years of coerced speech is better speech, e.g., the NAACP's demanding
that South Carolina, Mississippi, and Georgia use their designated public fora to fly the
Black Power flag and the Rainbow Flag for thirty-eight years or more over the South
Carolina, Mississippi, and Georgia statehouses.
2.

Yes. Because prior restraint bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,
since ordinary, presumably speaking picnickers and travelers need not apply for permits to
speak, the state's requiring a permit of those expressing political views is improper prior
restraint as a content-based restriction of political speech. The state may not erect
cumbersome obstacles to a type of speech absent compelling state interest without procedural
safeguards to contain the unfettered discretion of state officials like Charlie Condon or the
South Carolina police. No procedural safeguards appear in the complaint.

3.

Yes, Madison's First Amendment protection of speech, assembly, and petition firmly
protects the NAACP's economic boycott as political speech, linking his drafting the First
Amendment while the Framers economically boycotted British tea to the NAACP's boycott
of Claibome Hardware

4.

No. Sections 131 and 120 (improperly labeled Section 1209) of the Highway Safetyportion
of the Code of Federal Regulations cited by Condon do not independently preclude political
speech, mandate silence or mental rest, or even relate to the peaceful carrying of pickets or
distributing of leaflets. n4 Further, Section 131 explicitly regulates "advertising"through
erected signs, i.e., commercial speech through billboards, not political, verbal and written

speech.

Q

A. In fact, while the rest areas are indeed designed to promote the safety of the driver
through physical rest, they also are intended to provide "information of interest to the
traveling public." n5 Surely, information about boycott and statehouse flags and monuments
is information of interest to the traveling public. Thus, rather than discourage political
speech, the Code of Federal Regulations encourages information-exchange in the rest areas.
Thus, NAACP's and EURO's speech are protected in the rest areas. Consequently, the
resffinformation area is at least a designated public forum, if not a traditional public forum.
Condon cites no state law violated by defendants.

B. Other sections of the Code of Federal Regulations not cited by Condon refute his
presentation of visitor silence and mental emptiness as necessary to the governmental interest
of traffic safety. In fact, some sections support speech and assembly as consistent with
traffic safety, e.g., those encouraging carpooling and innovative ways to promote traffic
safety.

Even if traffic safety were a sufficient interest to compel suppressing political

speech, the context of the very regulations on which Condon relies refute his argument.
Clearly, providing information is not inconsistent with traffic safety, and Congress did not
view political information as inconsistent enough to note the exception. Further, South
Carolina's effort to proscribe political speech is void for overbreadth and vagueness.
ARGUMENT

1.

While clearly state action, South Carolina 'sflyingthe Confederateflagover the statehouse
and a government building do not yet improperly compelprivate citizen speech to support
controversial,political views repugnani to some citizem.

Flying a flag is speech, especially a political flag. In American Legion Post 7v. Durham, the

Fourth Circuit analyzed flags as 'pure speech." n6 The Legion had been cited for flying an
"oversized and well recognized symbol of political speech," the American flag. n7 As the court
noted, political flags enjoy a particularly favored position in the First Amendment hierarchy. Id.
Burning a flag is protected political expressive conduct. Texas v. Johnson. n8 So is affixing apeace
symbol and flying the flag upside down. Spence v. Washington.n9 As the Spence court noted, "the
context in which a symbol is.used for purposes of expression is important, for the context may give
meaning to the symbol." n10 Durham's ordinance limiting the Legion's political speech to smaller
size thus burdens political speech. n l 1 Yet the Durham burden closely resembles New York City's
incidental burden restricting rock concert volume in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. n12 In Ward,
the Supreme Court had upheld the scheme limiting volume as a valid time, place, and manner
restriction. n13 Yet the Legion's position is stronger because the flag is a political symbol. Thus,
South Carolina's flag-flying is political speech.
Does South Carolina's political choice to fly the Confederate flag constitute "state action"?
The application of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment
fieedoms constitutes "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment. n14 South Carolina has
attempted to apply state rules of law in state court in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment
freedoms. The Eleventh Circuit in Coleman v. Miller, one variation on Confederate flag
jurisprudence, simply assumed that Georgia's flying the Confederate flag constituted state action.
nl5 Thus, South Carolina's choice likely constitutes "state action" as well.
Though South Carolina's flying the Confederate flag is state action, the courts have not
concluded that such governmental display of the symbol of this particular political view is compelled
speech. In Coleman, an African American reported that Georgia's choice to fly the Confederateflag
over state office buildings like the statehouse forced him to adopt a message endorsing
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discriminationagainst African Americans, a message he found morally offensive. n16 Because hate
groups like the Ku K l w Klan frequently flew that flag, he reported that it thus inspired in him a fear
of violence, sense of self-devaluation, and view of personal exclusion from Georgia's state processes.
n17 Because he relied only on his own testimony to establish the disproportionate racial effect
required to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, Coleman failed to convince
the court that Georgia's action tangibly harmed African Americans or comparatively harmed white
citizens less. n18

Moving to a Fi-Amendment claim, Coleman argued that Georgia's

prominently flying the flag on government buildings forced him to be "an instnunent for fostering
public adherence to an ideological point of view he qound] unacceptable." Wooley v. Maymrd. nl9
As Justice Jackson noted for the Supreme Court, the government cannot force individuals
affirmativelyto endorse messages with which they disagree. See West VirginiaBoard of Education
v. Barnette. n20 Yet, because Coleman had not been required to salute the Confederate flag, the

Eleventh Circuit ruled that Coleman had demonstrated no such governmental coercion of "a belief or
state of mind." n21 Further, the Coleman court found that the Confederate flag was not an
unambiguous message of racism. Thus a citizen's having to enter public buildings over which the
battle flag flew did not infiinge his First Amendment rights or occasion constitutional injury because
it did not associate that citizen with the flag's message.
With Coleman, the Eleventh Circuit confirmed its holding in NAACP v. Hunt, n22 in which
African Americans challenged Alabama's flying the Confederate flag above the capitol dome. The
NAACP presented that the flag chilled free speech because it created emotional difficulty for those
who had to salute the American flag positioned atop the Capitol while the Confederate flag flew.
n23 The court contended that the law could not make decisions based on sensitivity though it agreed

that the flag signaled discriminato~yintent. Arguing that the plaintiffs had presented no specific
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factual proof of disproportionateimpact, Justice Johnson presented in dicta that, while the claim was
precluded by res judicata, because all citizens were equally exposed to the flag and citizens of all
races offended by its position, the court would havenevertheless rejected Hunt's First- Amendment
challenge because "Alabama d[id] not compel its citizens to carry or post the flagthemselves, or to
support whatever cause it m[ight] represent." 024
Yet in Hunt, the NAACP had persuasively argued that the flag was government speech which
improperly conveyed a limited rather than evenhanded set of messages, providing a limited public
forum to that limited set of messages. n25 Government speech itself is not protected by the First
Amendment. n26 Further, the government may not favor certain views by granting public fora to
those whose views it h d s acceptable while denying them to those it finds unacceptable. n27
The process of government's granting public fora is especially important when the
govemment's dedication of a forum suppresses controversial speech, i.e., engages in impermissible
viewpoint discrimination. Cinevision Corp. v. Cify of Burbank. n28 Nor may government
monopolize the marketplace of ideas, drowning out citizen sources of speech. Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. n29 Thus, the govemment may not confer radio frequencies on those
broadcasters it prefers. Nor may the government "compel persons to support candidates, parties,
ideologies or causes that they are against." Hunt. n30 Yet the Hunt court summarily found that the
capitol dome was not public property 'by tradition or designation a forum [used] for public
communication." Peny Educ. Assn. v. P e r v local Educator's Assn. n3 1 Thus, falling under the
weakest rules for First Amendment scrutiny of fora, Alabama could reserve the dome as anonpublic
forum for its own communicative purposes if the reservation was "&onable

and ... not an effort to

suppress expression because the officials oppose[d] the speaker's view." Hunt. 1132 Because
Alabama did not actually legislate its citizens to salute the Confederate flag, the court viewed the

P.
7

.

state's using the capitol dome to fly the Confederate flag as reasonable and not suppressive of

.?

contrary views. Acknowledging that flying 'the Confederate flag was a political matter, the remedy
lying within voting process and democratic process, the Hunt court concluded that Alabama could
continue to fly the Confederate flag. Whether it had to open the forum to contrary views was not
addressed.

In a case which much more clearly analyzed the forum, Sons of Confederate Veterans v.
Holcomb, n33 the Sons sought a declaratory judgment firom the federal district court to require
Virginia to place the Confederate flag on their specialty license plates. The court first reviewed
whether the plates represented speech of the Commonwealth or of the Sons. Having determined that
the specialty plates represented private speech of the Sons, the court reasoned the plates thus
implicated their First Amendment rights, just as specialty plates of occupational and civic
associations, and "so forth" represented private speech. n34 The court distinguished such private,
specialty-plate speech from the state motto "Live Free or Die" on the official licenses of Wooley.
n35 The plates were property of the Commonwealth, i.e., the Commonwealth controlled the forum.
Yet the Plaintiffs' speech being the issue, the "politically engaged" Sons viewed the Confederate flag
as their protected political speech. n36
As the Holcomb court noted, the Sons' speech did not fall into one of three categorical
exceptions to speech protection, i.e., fighting words, defamation, and obscenity. See R.A. V. v. St.

Paul. n37 Thus, the Confederate flag logo was protected speech on the license plate. As the
Holcomb court noted about the same symbol, "regardless of the type of forum, any government
regulation of speech must be viewpoint-neutral." Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Glendening. n38
The Mississippi Supreme Court in Daniels v. Harrison County Bd. ofSupervisors also argued, as a
matter of public policy, that divisive flags like the Confederate flag and swastika belonged in
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museums, not flying at government facilities. 1139 This is consistent with the Supreme Court's
recent proscription against government's 'exercis[ing] viewpoint discrimination, even when the
limited forum is one of its own creation." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Va. n40 The

Holcomb court viewed the state's effort to avoid displaying the Confederate flag on the state
specialty forum because of political controversy as understandablebut doubly inappropriate because
it highlighted the political nature of the speech, its protected status, and impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. n41
Having found that the state had violated the First Amendment through impermissible
viewpoint discrimination, the Holcomb court indicated that such a determination sufficed to overturn
the ban as unconstitutional, but the court also chose to analyze the forum. As the court outlined,
government property typically divided into three categories for First Amendment analysis:
traditional public forum, designated public forum, and nonpublic forum. Cornelius v. NAACP. n42
Typical traditional fora included streets, parks, and town squares. A designated public forum
'consists of public property which the state has opened for use by the public as aplace for expressive
activity." P e w . n43

For such fora, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are

permissible, and content-based regulations necessitate M e r i n g a compelling state interest.
Finally, a nonpublic forum is public property that has not been opened to expression by tradition or
designation. Such property permitted governmental regulation of speech provided regulations are
reasonable and not an effort to suppress speech government officials oppose, n44
Applying these criteria, the Holcomb court turned to four factors from Corrnelius to test
which forum pertained as follows: government policy, government practice, nature of the property,
and compatibility of fit between expressive activity and forum. n45 Government practice of
permitting a wide range of specialty plates and the nexus between controversial, private speech
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interests and payment to speak on the plates were particularly persuasive in that case. Based on two

,Q

factors particularly, the controversial stances taken on the plates and the very existence of such
plates, the court found that the specialty plate program was, though not a traditional forum, clearly a
public forum opened by the state to private citizens and thus a designated public forum. Further, the
Confederate flag was undeniably controversial, private speech even if ambiguous in meaning.

In a case suggesting how to manage offensive speech inoffensively, Griftin v. Veterans
Affairs, 1146 the Fourth Circuit examined the constitutional import of the Veterans Administration's

following federal regulations, proscribing "partisan activities" and "displayof any ... foreign flags."
n47
The Veterans Administration (V.A.) thus had not opened the forum to expression of political
viewpoints, and Point Lookout was thus a nonpublic fonun. The V.A. had chosen to fly the
Confederate flag two days per year in the national cemetery, but Griffin argued that restrictions
causing failure to fly the flag more frequently were facially and specifically unconstitutional. The
Fourth Circuit disagreed, reversing the district court. and finding that the purpose of Point Lookout
was honoring, in tranquil and nonpartisan surroundings,those having given their lives for the Nation.
The Court viewed the Secretary's restrictions for this nonpublic forum to be "reasonable" as a means
of insuring the integrity of the VA's message, i.e., a government message that they would honor
Confederate soldiers as "citizens of the United States" and "Americaris." n48 The Flag Manual on
which the VA relied indicated that flags "may not be displayed on NCA property as a means of
political activity or similar conduct that promotes any particular viewpoint" (limiting most forms of
expression on VA property).
As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, the government is entitled to promote particular messages
and take steps to insure that its messages are not garbled so long as its restrictions are reasonable,
Q
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they need not bethe most or the only reasonable limitations. Cornelius. n49 Drawing from R.A. K.
as the Court pointed out, the First Amendment likely may not tolerate the kind of favoritism of
political speech that Griffin apparently advocated in arguingthat flying the Confederate flag to honor
'Confederate dead" as "Confederates" rather than as "Americans" does not occasion counterspeech.
n50 Because the V.A. actually did not allow other flags to fly than the American flag, the groups
endorsing the Confederate flag actually enjoyed an advantage over other groups politically. As the
Court noted, the V.A. may not license one side to fight freestyle while forcing the other to follow
Queensbeny rules. Though Griffin presented the V.A.'s restrictions as unconstitutional prior
restraint, the Court found no First-Amendment problem, no entitlement to daily display of the
Confederate flag in a nonpublic forum, and thus no prior restraint.
In this case, because it is not a street, park, or town square, South Carolina's statehouse
flagpole is not a traditional public forum. Yet, unlike the V.A. in Gn%f;n,the state has opened this
forum to express controversial, private speech through flying the Confederate flag on that flagpole
every day of the year for 38 years, i.e., speech expressing the views of EURO and the Ku Klux Klan.
The very existence of the flagpole for controversial private speech like the Confederate flag, just as
in Holcomb, supports that the state designated its flagpole as a public forum. The Coleman court
found discriminatory intent coloring the Confederate flag's adoption in Georgia. 1151 The
controversial nature of that flag when flying over a statehouse underscores its venerable history as
the battle flag lifted over South Carolina to cement massive resistance, spearheaded by John D.
Long, after the Supreme Court's landmark implementation decision in Brown v. Bd. ofEducation.
n52
In a recent case, implicitly using its flagpole as a designated public forum, Ohio's Statehouse
flew the rainbow flag as a part of a gay pride celebration. Defendant-appellant Spingola climbed the

r

flagpole and cut it down, stating that a gay pride flag should not fly b m a government flagpole.

Columbus v. Spingola. n53 Ohio's Tenth Appellate District examined Spingola's argument that the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to his necessity defense for his convicting him for
criminal damaging. Because the state's flying the rainbow flag was lawful, the court refused the
appeal, drawing on Ohio's delineation of a necessity defense as response to unlawful action. n54.
While most of the case has little relevance to constitutional issues, Ohio's using its flagpole as a
designated public forum has supported statehouse flagpoles as designated public for& Obviously,
Spingola saw the flag as political speech and responded with unlawful expressive conduct. Had he
requested to fly an anti-gay pride flag, the results might have been different.
Similarly, South Carolina has created a designated public forum, allowing arguably racially
discriminatory speech and may not commit constitutional injury through discriminating
impermissibly by viewpoint. Yet such viewpoint discrimination has not been sufficiently tested.
Though the Confederate flag is an unambiguous symbol of racists, likely of racism as well,
demonstrated by EURO's tuming out at the rest areas to support its flying, the Holcomb court does
not find it to be unambiguous. Nor did the Eleventh Circuit in Coleman. Thus, flying the
Confederate flag on a statehouse flagpole is not constitutional injury because flying it does not
unambiguously deprive anyone of constitutional, First-Amendment rights. n55. Yet flying the
Confederate flag is undeniably a political matter. n56
However, even if one cannot prove that the Confederate flag is an unambiguous symbol of
racism, despite its popularity with hate groups, the flagpole is a designated public forum, and the
flag-because controversial and judicially determined to have discriminatory intent--is firmly a
political symbol. Thus, since government has no independent speech right, South Carolinamay not
espouse that political view without permitting counterspeech, i.e., the espousal of contrary,
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controversial, arguably ambiguously racist views in its same designated political forum, i.e., flying a
contrary flag on the South Carolina statehouse flagpole. While South Carolina may reserve the
dome for private, political expression, it may not suppress contrary political views. Thus, the
NAACP and PFLAG need to request that South Carolina fly political, controversial, possibly
ambiguously racist flags on the South Carolina statehouse flagpole. Though they may not have
sufficiently ambiguously racist legacy, possible flag counterspeech could include flying the Black
Power and rainbow flags. If indeed, the South Carolina legislatureand government have not favored
a particular form of political speech over another in a designated public forum that South Carolina
opened to a particular political symbol, South Carolina will fly these flags, perhaps as long as it flew
the Confederateflag, i.e., 38 years. Should South Carolina refuse to fly controversial political flags
expressing contrary views, First Amendment injury will exist because South Carolina will have
impermissibly discriminated against a contrary, private, political viewpoint.
11.

South Carolina 5 requiringpermits before NAACP and EURO visitors to South Carolina
information centers may speak about political concerns is improper prior restraint of
political speech.
Because speech about the Confederate flag on the South Carolina statehouse flagpole is

political, NAACP and EURO speech about that flag's placement is also political speech. So is speech
about the NAACP's boycott of South Carolina to impact South Carolina's legislative choices about
that flagpole's use as a designated public forum. n57 South Carolina's requiring permits ofNAACP
and EURO visitors to roadside rest areas, obstructingtheir informing visitors of the flagpole and the
boycott, is improper prior restraint of political speech.
'Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the [Supreme] Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan. n 58 The Supreme

Court has consistently required definite and objective standards to be set forth and followed when
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government delegates to an official the power to limit citizen speech, containing the tendency of
officials to exercise unfettered discretion. See Shuttlesworth v. City ofBirmingham. n59
In particular, in Freedman v. Mayland, n60 the Supreme Court mandated four standards to
satisfy when official permission is required to engage in First-Amendment expression as follows: 1)
a permit must be granted or denied within the briefest possible time, the time specified in' the
ordinance; 2) if permission is denied, the ordinance must provide a specific, brief period within
which a permanent or temporary injunction must be obtained, 3)any restraint imposed prior to a final
judicial determination on the merits must be limited to maintaining the status quo for the shortest
possible, specified time period; 4) prompt judicial determination must be assured.

In FW/PBS, Znc. v. City ofDallas, n61 the Court identified the two essential safeguards, i.e.,
specified, reasonable, time period for discussion, and access to promptjudicialreview. The Attorney
General's complaint fails to specify any time period though request for declaratory judgment
presumably insures prompt judicial review. Both are constitutionally required.

Outlining the

constitutional burden on prior restraint even for commercial speech, Young v. Roseville, n62
recounts plaintiff-attorney's efforts to obtain permit to fly the Jolly Roger, modified to identify his
law firm and areas of practice. The federal district court heard plaintiffs request for preliminary
injunction of Roseville's attempt to enforce its ordinance requiring permitting of flags, signs, or
banners. He sought permission twice to fly his flag, the second time text-&,

both times which the

official refused on the grounds that it was a banner, which could be banned outright, rather than a
sign, which could be regulated. n63 Plaintiff claimed that Roseville's distinctions among flags,
banners, and signs were impermissibly content-based. n64 Specifically, Roseville permitted
unregulated flying of flags of foreign nations with diplomatic relations with the United States or
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flags relating to any civic, charitable, religious, patriotic, corporate, fkitemal or similar organization.
But Roseville regulated flags of nations without diplomatic relations, e.g., Cuba or Iran. While
Roseville defended the distinction based on differing legal treatment accorded commercial and
noncommercial speech, the court elaborated that, even under the deferential Central Hudson standard
accorded commercial speech, Roseville's ordinance failed. n65 As the plaintiff contended, under
Roseville's ordinance, even a corporate flag flying the Pillsbury doughboy could be flown permit-

h.
Roseville's justifications for its permitting scheme were traffic safety and aesthetics. But, as the
court noted, these were insufficient justifications for restricting even commercial speech. Though
Roseville did not appear to have animus for the Jolly Roger's particular message, the permitting
scheme was too vaguely defined, too imprecisely restrictive of speech, and failed to articulate
definite and objective standards for officials to follow in limiting private speech. n66 Thus, the
ordinance failed constitutional muster by allowing too much discretion to vest in city officials.
On first inspection, South Carolina's requiring a permit for NAACP as well as its opponent,
EURO, to use a "rest area" for speech as well as rest purposes suggests that South Carolina at least
may not be harboring animus against disfavored NAACP speech, just against political speech. But
South Carolina's declaratoryjudgment action is based on impermissible prior restraint because it lists
no law that relates to its claims. Those listed do not support the Attorney General's limits on
noncommercial, political speech at all.
In specific, Title 23, Highways, n67 indicates that the Safety Rest-Areasare for the 'rest" and
"information needs" of the motorist, to include "information centers ... at safety rest areas which
provide information of interest to the traveling public." Thus, the NAACP's and EURO's activities
completely accord with the expected and desired purposes of the rest areas. Further, no federal
statutes or codes cited by the Attorney General require permits for First-Amendment political or
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controversial activities. The Attorney General presumes that controversial speech is contrary to

n

traffic safety because controversial speech is not listed as a goal of the rest area. But informationsharing is. Further, to avoid the 'highway hypnosis" he decries, few tonics could be better than a

rousing, robust political debate.

In fact, the federal codes control only some commercial speech carefully through Title 23,
Section 131 for 'commercial" advertising or affixed billboards. n68 As the statutory canon of
construction goes, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., explicit exceptions are deemed exclusive.
Daniels v. Harrison CountyBd, of Supervisors n69 So, presumably, where the statute lists no other

exceptions to First-Amendment protection of speech, no other exceptions presumably exist. Also,
Section 131, controlling outdoor advertising, which simply regulates "erection and maintenance of
outdoor advertising, signs, displays, and devices," requires that the Secretary of Transportation
conduct a rulemaking process to insure that signs "giving specific information in the interest of the
traveling public" be erected and maintained. n70 Permanent signs, i.e., those erected, which none of
the NAACP or EURO signs are, will "conform to national standards ... promulgated by the Secretary."
n71 No other process is outlined in the Attomey General's complaint, and the federal regulations
specify no other prior restraint on eee speech. Further, neither NAACP nor EURO are advertising
commercially or erecting billboards; and both provide political, i.e., highly protected, speech through
"information in the interest of the traveling public." The state has also indicated no requirement that
other visitors to South Carolina's information centers must obtain permits before picnicking or
speaking to other visitors. In the sign copied for the complaint, no such requirement is posted at the
information centers. Thus, because federal law requires no permit for political speech in rest areas, the
request for permit is unconstitutional as applied.
While the federal regulations permit the state to "establish standards imposing stricter
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limitations" on erected signs, displays, and devices, those signs regulated under Title 23 are erected
signs, displays, and devices, not picket signs. The federal code urges the state to provide information
as to "places of interest within the state." n72 Surely, South Carolina's statehouse and the monument
several yards away are places of interest within South Carolina.
Federal regulations of the Department of Transportation do allow the state to "establish or
permit information systems within the right-of way ...which provide information of specific interest
to the traveling public which do not visually intrude upon the main-traveledway of the highway." n73
Yet verbal interactions among NAACP and EURO members and other visitors, leafleting, and
picketing at the rest area do not visually intrude on the main-traveled way. Title23, Section 625.4
restricts 'appurtenances," not picketing or speech, controversial or noncontroversial. n74 Title 23
encourages "provid[ing]"rather than restricting "information in the specific interest of the traveling
public." n75
Patently, South Carolina has interpreted federal regulations contrary to their express language
and intent. Further, while the federal code identifies procedural safeguardsto protect speech (e.g., the
~ h ~ a k i process),
ng
the lack of such defined state safeguards allows unfettered discretion by state
officials and police to suppress disfavored speech by creating cumbersome ostensible "federal"
baniers to speech. The permit requirement appears unconstitutional as applied and likely pretextual.
The Attomey General's complaint misappli,es federal law and ignores federal and state
constitutional protections. Both the federal and South Carolina constitutions identify FirstAmendment protections of speech dismissed lightly in the Attomey General's complaint, i.e., the First
Amendment and its South Carolina cousin, n76 which essentially repeats the federal First
Amendment protections for speech, petition, and peaceable assembly. The Attomey General's
complaint identifies no instances of non-peaceable assembly by EURO or NAACP. Further, the
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South Carolina Constitution, like the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution, provides for

,*,

due process, i.e., 'no person shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-judicial decision of an
administrative agency affecting private rights except on due notice and an opportunity to be heard

...nor shall he be deprived of liberty or property unless by a mode of procedure prescribed by the
General Assembly." n77 Federal statute also precludes discovery and admission as evidence of
certain reports. Thus, South Carolina's potential attempt to introduce evidence of traffic safety
against the NAACP and EURO,based on federal law, appears contrary to federal law. n78 In this
instance, because the NAACP and EURO received no notice and had no legislatively prescribed
procedure, i.e., procedural safeguards, South Carolina has attempted improper prior restraint on their
political speech. n79 Without procedural safeguards to protect speech, constitutional injuy occurs.

III.

Following the ironclad American tradition of political speech beginning with Madison's
writing the First Amendment while supporting boycott ofBritish tea, the NAACP Spolitical&
motivated economic boycott ofSouth Carolina is protectedpolitical speech.

Having recognized the futility of wresting the Confederate flag fiom Southern strongholdson
First-Amendment and equal protection grounds, the NAACP employed protected counterspeech
through economic boycott with political ends.

South Carolina, like Georgia, removed the

Confederate flag from the statehouse after months of nationally organized marches and economic
boycotts. 1180 Leaders h m Coca Cola, BellSouth, The Southern Company, and Georgia-Pacific
worked to change the Georgia flag for a year before the introduction of a compromise bill. Monied
speech, prompted by economic boycott, shifted Southern resistance. n81
Because monetary gain of the speakers had not tainted the NAACP's economic boycott for
political purposes, the First Amendment protected the boycott as speech. In a case distinguishable

h m South Carolina ex rel. Condon v. NAACP, Federal Trade Commissionv. Superior Court Trial

'
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Lawers Assn. (SCTLA),n82 the Supreme Court examined the Fi-Amendment protection ofboycott
by private attorneys, who regularly acted as court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants. When
the attorneys in concert (SCTLA) refused to provide such representation until the District increased
their compensation,the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had filed a complaint against the attorney
association after they returned to work, alleging that they had conspired to fix prices and conduct a
boycott that constituted unfair competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act.

Despite the

unimpeachably political objectives, i.e., favorable legislation, the Court ruled that the economic
motivation of the attorneys left their boycott outside the exception to antitrust law provided by
previous Supreme Court ruling in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc. Because the attorneys' alleged restraint of trade was the means rather than the intended
consequence by which respondents sought to obtain favorable legislation, the Noerr doctrine did not
apply. 1-83 Because their actions allowed them economic leverage to raise their own compensation,
their boycott also did not fall within the First-Amendment protection afforded politically motivated,
civil rights boycotts by the Court in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. n84
However, the NAACP boycott of South Carolina falls squarely within the First-Amendment
protection delineated first in Claiborne. Demonstrating the Court's continuing adherence to the
,

earlier holding, the Supreme Court quoted Claibome, in SCTLA, n85 that the "right of the States to
regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically
motivated boycott designed to force govemmental ... change." n86 Distinguishing Claiborne from
SClZA, the Court noted that the former speakers "sought no special advantage for themselves. "They
merely sought "to change a social order that had consistently treated them as second class citizens."
n87 The present vitality of minority experience of second-class citizenship is revealed in different,
poorer patterns of minority, particularly African-American, access to health care. n88 Further,
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American physicians perceive Afican Americans more negatively, even when script, clothing, and

/7

looks of pseudopatients are similar. n89 Thus, for every service studied, African Americans receive
poorer care, fewer surgical interventions, fewer diagnostic test, and fewer medical services, resulting

in lower survival rates, longer hospitalizations, half-as-likely pain medication and twice-as-likely
amputation. n90
In Claiborne itselt the Court had articulated crucial First-Amendment principles. Even when
the organizer speaks in a fiery way as Charles Evers, the NAACP field secretary who instigated the
boycott in Claiborne, did, i.e., threatening to "break [the] damn necks" of those who did not follow
the boycott, the boycott enjoyed protection as did the organizers. In Claiborne,the boycott included
such expressive conduct as protesters stopping patrons from going into white stores to communicate
the fact that a boycott was in progress and to request that they not patronize white stores. n91 The
Court concluded that the nonviolent elements of petitioners' expressive conduct, i.e., picketing,
leafleting, marching, individual attempts at persuasion, speeches, other communication, including
economic boycott, were all entitled to First-Amendment protection because 'speech to protest racial
discrimination is essential political speech lying at the core of the First Amendment." n92 The Court
argued that " through exercise of their First Amendment rights of speech, assembly, association, and
petition, rather than through riot or revolution, petitioners sought to bring about political, social, and
economic change." n93 In specific, the Court ruled as follows:

1) political boycott and subsequent supportive, expressive conduct are protected under the
First Amendment, n94
2) peaceful picketing of a business for political reasons cannot be burdened by state tort
liability even if it interferes with prospective economic advantage, n95
3) violence and other criminal acts are bases of tort liability and not constitutionallyprotected
-,
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even if politically motivated n96, but
4) the organizer of aboycott may not be held personally liable for the tortious or criminal acts

of followers unless helshe demonstrably autho&

specificallydirected, or ratified such acts.

n97
Most pertinent, the Court viewed that "permissible scope of state remedies in this area is strictly
confined to the direct consequences of such [violent] conduct and does not include consequences
resulting from associated peaceful picketing" or other protected communication. n98 Thus, damages
were restricted to those directly, proximately caused by and chargeable to defendants. As the Court
directed, the States "may not award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent protected
activity." 1199Thus,in order to award compensation, the State "must establish that the group itself
possessed unlawful goals and that the [organizer] held a specific intent to further those illegal aims."
nlOO Voiding Fit-Amendment protection because many audience members were intimidated is
"flatly inconsistent with the First Amendment." nl 01
Thus, the general rule is that the expressive conduct of boycott for noneconomic purposes,
includingpeaceful picketing, leafleting, and confronting sometimes intimidated others with political
speech, is protected. Where the conduct is violent or self-serving in the economic sense, the conduct
is not protected. nI02 In the case here, unlike Claiborne,the NAACP has made no fiery comments
that could conceivably direct violence. Condon's complaint lists the following NAACP expressive
conduct in support of the boycott: "seeking ro call the attention of travelers to the
economic boycott of South Carolina businesses

... attempted

... holding signs, passing out flyers, or otherwise

directly or indirectly making their views on public issues known to travelers." n103
Holding signs, passing out flyers, and making views on public issues known to anyone are
the core of First-Amendment protected expressive conduct. Each of the NAACP's expressive and

informative activities here is protected speech, each specifically listed among Claiborne's own

n

description of First-Amendment protected boycott activity. In Claiborne, even the intimidated
audience may not avoid the speech of protected speakers;the "unrested"or tired audience holds less
sway for needs to avoid First-Amendment activity. While the Condon complaint speaks to the need
to insure that the "weary traveler" is not a "captive" audience, surely the weary traveler may simply
walk away or close hidher car window. 11104
In a case firmly establishing the currency of Claibornek precepts, the Ninth Circuit has
followed the Supreme Court in Claiborne, expecting the pregnant about-to-be aborter or her
frightened abortionist to vote with feet or draperies.

Planned Parenthood of the

Columbia/Willamette,Inc. v. American Coalition ofLiJe Ministries. n105 As the Brandenburg v.
Ohio Court clarified, "political speech may not be punished just because it makes it more likely that
someone will be harmed at some unknown time in the future" unless the speech can "produce
imminent lawless action." n106 When the courts protect the publication by pro-lifers of a potential
"hit list" of doctors as protected speech, speech and pamphletting about boycott by NAACP and

EURO visitors to rest areas may not fall to speculative, undocumented concerns about potential
traffic safety problems. Such innocent, anemic concerns hardly qualify as exceptions to the general
rule protecting red-blooded, even bloodthirsty political speech.
In a case outlining a different justification for finding a boycott unprotected, the Second
Circuit applied Claiborne's principles in Jewsfor Jesus v. Jewish Community Relations Council of

New York, Znc. (JCRC). n107 Defendants-appellees had successfully leveraged the Stevensville
Country Club with threatened economic boycott by the Jewish community unless the Stevensville
canceled its contract with plaintiff-appellant Jews for Jesus (JFJ). Plaintiff JFJ appealed the district
court ruling in favor of summaryjudgment for defendants, arguingthat the speech in question was not
,?
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protected because it was used solely to compel the Stevensville to cancel its JFJ contract Essentially,
JCRC had contacted four Jewish groups, asking whether they would consider using a kosher catering
or hotel facility that JFJ used. Next the defendants had contacted Mehl caterers, planned to cater the
JCRC function and informed them that, if the Stevensville honored its JFJ wntract, an important
Orthodox Jewish group would have to cancel its planned convention. The caterers and the Orthodox
Jewish group contacted the Stevensville separately with the same message. The President of the
JCRC also informed the President of the Stevensville. n108 JFJ, contract canceled, argued that
defendants conspired to deprive them of their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988)
and tortiously interfered with JFJ's contract, and deprived them of their civil right to obtain public
accommodation .without discrimination on account of race and/or creed. Basing its holding on
Claiborne,the district court had reasoned that, because plaintiffs would have had no cause of action if
defendants simply stopped patronizing the Stevensville without explanation, the collective
conveyance of the reason did not change that underlying rationale. 1-1109 The Second Circuit, on
review, stressed the Supreme Court's view that legal prohibition required race-or perhaps class-based
animus behind the conspirators' actions. n110
Several courts, including the Second Circuit, have defined 'class-basedn animus to include
discrimination based on religion, and plaintiffs argued that defendants had conspired to discriminate
based on their espousal of evangelical Christianity. Defendants argued that their actions were based
instead on JFJ's deceptive misuse of traditional Jewish symbols and practices, e.g., wearing
yarmulkes. The Court ruled that these fact-based questions required jury trial rather than summary
judgment. n l l l While Jews can sue for racial discrimination, see e.g., Le-BIanc-Sternberg v.
Fletcher, n112 the Second Circuit determined that JFJ could not allege racial discrimination under§
1985 (3) because JFJ contained Jews and non-Jews and could not thus be viewed as a class. Thus, this
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cause of action failed.
Then, turning to the common argument against the legitimacy of an economic boycott, i.e.,
tortious interference with contract, the JFJ Court balanced whether the interference was justified
under the circumstancesof the particular case by examining the nature of the defendants' conduct, the
defendants' motive, the plaintiffs' interests with which defendants interfed, the interests sought to be
advanced by defendants, social interests at stake, proximity of defendants conduct to interference, and
relations between the parties. n113 The Court again ruled that material issues of fact required jury
determination, here to discover whether defendants' conduct stemmed &om JFJ's deceptive use of
traditional Jewish symbols or impermissible discriminatory reasons. The Court viewed this
determination as prerequisite to ruling on whether defendants tortiously interferedwith JFJ's contract.
If the motive were impermissible, i.e., discriminatory, then government's interest in preventing
discrimination and in preventing tortious interference with contract might permit incidental burden on
defendants' expressive conduct in boycott.
Finally, the Court examined whether the State could constitutionally regulate defendants'
expressive conduct. Under United States v. OBrien, n114 states could regulate conduct if such
conduct entails incidental limitation on speech, if such regulation is within government's
constitutionalpower, 'furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of &ee expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." nl15
Speech that is the very vehicle of crime is not protected, e.g., conspiracy. n116 In JFJ,the Second
Circuit decided that New York statutes outlawing directly discriminatory conduct passed muster
under the third OlBrien criterion, i.e., were constitutional, being no broaderthan necessary to further
the legitimate goal of preventing discrimination.
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Further, the Second Circuit ruled that the First Amendment did not bar liability for common
law tortious interference with speech because common law like the discrimination statutes regulated
conduct, not speech. Next, the Court turned to the general rule that the F i t Amendment provided no
defense to persons using otherwise protected speech or expressive conduct to force or aid others in
violation of a valid conduct-regulating statute. n117 Finally, refening to both Claibome andSClZ4

,the Court interpreted case law and commentary to recognize that boycott, like any expression, if
designed to secure an unlawful objective, is not protected by the First Amendment. nl18 In JFJ,the
Court found that, unlike Claibome, the JCRC and JFJ dispute was private conduct, not designed to
achieve governmental action to vindicate legitimate rights.

In the case here, the question is whether the NAACP's boywn and supportive expressive
activity at the rest areas are designed to secure an unlawful objective or designed to petition
government to vindicate legitimate rights. The NAACP's objective is to petition, legislate, or boycon
southern states like South Carolina so that they cease flying the Confederate flag over government
buildings. Unlike SCTLA, the NAACP's objective does not effect personal, financial gain; it likely
costs time and money to engage in the economic boycott and supportive expression. Petitioning
government is a firmly First-Amendment objective, protected by United States and South Carolina
constitutions and common law. Holcomb, Coleman, and Hunt demonstrate that South Carolina's
flying the Confederate flag on the statehouse or several yards away does not create constitutional
injury but patently opens a designated public forum for private speech. While there are no instances
of a Southern state's refusing to fly an opposing flag, the NAACP's boywn and supporting expressive
conduct have engaged in and prepared the way for counterspeech. Should any state now refuse pure
counterspeech, i.e., flying opposing flags, having flown the Confederate flag and opened designated
fora in several states, those states that refuse to provide the designated forum to opposing viewpoints
A
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would be practicing viewpoint discrimination.

?

Thus, the NAACP's expressive, boycott activity has shone a national spotlight on a strategy
for revealing racial discrimination and likely upcoming constitutional injury through viewpoint
discrimination. Revealing viewpoint and racial discrimination impels change in both, commendable,
not illegal, serving precisely the same constitutionally protected putpose as Claibonte's flawed but
protected boycott and the flawed but protected advertisement, "Heed Our Rising Voices," in Nau York
Times v. Sullivan. n119 While economic boycott is controversial, Claiborne and its briefs confirm
that boycott speech celebrates American consciousness and conscience and favored expressive
conduct. Using economic means to secure a constitutional objective follows the Framers and
Madison in particular, the Framer who authored the First Amendment. Because insuring viewpoint
and racial fairness is completely legal, if the rest areas are designated public fora, the NAACP and

EURO may engage there in political debate about the Confederate flag.
Cinevision and GnBn clarify that the state itself has no F i t Amendment right to speech.
Posner cements this view in Creek v. Village of Westhaven. n120 Further, Posner points out that
government entities do not have the right to foment discrimination on grounds of race, which
arguably South Carolina and other southern states have done. n121 Thus, where the state has opened
a forum to private speech, the state has created a designated public forum. Thus,while Wooley
supports that the state may promote its own message, Daniels establishes that the state may not
exercise viewpoint discrimination against speech where the state has opened the forum to private
speech, which the state would do if they refuse to permit counterspeech to the kind of speech for
which they opened the forum. Creek then confirms that the state may not present its own racist
views..
Thus, the question is whether NAACP's protected economicboycott and expressive conduct
Q
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may be regulated by South Carolina in rest areas opened for other First-Amendment purposes.

N

The NAACP's and EURO 's political speech and expressive conduct do not violatefederal or
state constitutional law;. nor, if they imperil traffic safe@, is traffic safely a compelling
governmental interest sufficing to warrant a content-based restriction on political speech.
A. The NAACP's and EURO 's political speech is protected under thefederal constitution's

First Amendment protection of fieedom of speech, assembly, and petition and South
Carolina's Constitutional~eedomof speech, petition, and assembly.
Both the federal and South Carolina constitutions identify First-Amendment protections of
speech, petition, and assembly, through the First Amendment and its South Carolina cousin, S.C.
Const. Ann. Art. I, 5 2, which essentially repeats the federal First-Amendment protections for speech,
petition, and peaceable assembly.

The NAACP boycott and expressive activity are thus protected

by federal and state constitutions as well as already demonstrated in common law. The NoerrPennington doctrine, derived from the First Amendment's guarantee of "the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances," shields kom antitrust liability entities who join together to
influence government action, even if they seek to restrain competition or damage competitors. n122
The doctrine applies to petitions before legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts. Davric

Maine COT. v. Rancourt. n123 Even secondary boycott, i.e., boycott designed to involve neutral
employers and businesses, if motivated by political issues, enjoys First-Amendment protection,
regardless of a state's broad power to regulate and protect economic activity. 11124

B. Federal lawpermitspolitical speech in the information/rest areas because it encourages
speech on 'hatters of interest to the travelingpublic." n125
1. Through federal law specifying that the purpose of the rest areas includes speech of interest
to the traveling public, political speech is included, and thus the informationlrest areas under federal
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funding and guidelines, i.e, all eight rest areas in Condon's complaint, have been opened to private
speech. One could argue that these rest areas by the roadside are just as much traditional fora as
streets and parks, but it is not necessary. They are at minimum designated public fora, and that is
enough for the NAACP to continue to speak.
2. South Carolina's interest in trafic safety is not a compelling governmental interest
suficient tojushfi a content-based restriction on politicalspeech, the most highlyprotectedform of
speech, in a designatedpublic forum like the South Carolinafederally regulated information/rest
areas.

In a case distinguishable from South Carolina ex rel. Charlie Condon v. NAACP & EURO,
American Legion Local 7 v. Durham, the Legion argued that Durham's effort to control its bunting

size was a content-based restriction on noncommercial speech and thus subject to strict scrutiny of its
constitutionality, i.e., that it had to be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest." n126 Yet,
while the American Legion court agreed that the ordinance restricted commercial speech more
carefully than noncommercial speech (i.e., more strict regulation of flags containing commercial
messages), the Court did not agree that size was a content criterion. 11127 Thus, the court concluded
that the Clark test for a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech would be
valid, i.e., firrthering a substantial government interest, narrowly tailored to advance the interest, and
leaving open ample alternative channels. See Clark v. Committeefor Creative Nonviolence. 11128
Durham argued that restricting the size of the American Legion flag furthered its interest in
maintaining community appearance, traffic safety, eliminatingvisual clutter, and preserving property
values.
Yet South Carolina's effort to restrict NAACP's and EURO's political speech in an
information/restarea is not content-neutral. In fact, South Carolina's complaint specificallypoints to
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prevention of speech that causes 'controversy." 11129 Thus, regulation suitable for content-neutral
speech does not apply in the instant case.

In a case shedding more light on this case, City of Cincinnati v. DiscoveryNetwork.Inc., n130
the Supreme Court examined Cincinnati's ordinance prohibiting distribution of commercial handbills
on public property. The City had offered "safety and attractive a p p e m c e of its streets and
sidewalks" as the rationale for its ordinance proscribing commercial speech. n13 1 Cincinnati had
removed commercial newsracks f?om public sidewalks while allowing nonwmmercial distribution.
Even though commercial speech did not enjoy the constitutional protections of nonwmmercial
speech, requiring only a substantial governmental interest, the Supreme Court struck down the
ordinancebecause there was "no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city hard]
asserted" and the ordinance's action baning the newsracks. n132 Yet, as the American Legion court
noted, these interests were sufficient to satisfy the "substantial government interest" prong of Clark
n133 The second prong, narrow tailoring, merely required that the substantial government interest
would be 'achieved less effectively absent the regulation." 11134 A time/place/mannerrestrictionis
not narrowly tailored if a substantial portion of its speech burden did not advance the goal, there of
aesthetics and traffic safety. 11135 Restricting flag size did generally advance aesthetics and traffic
safety. Last, the American Legion court applied the third prong of Clark to examine whether the
Durham ordinance left open ample alternative channels through a liberal special-permit process,
finding that the ordinance satisfied Clark's third prong. Thus,the regulation did advance a substantial
government interest in a reasonably well-tailored fashion through leaving open ample alternative
channels of communication. 11136

In this case, perhaps traffic safety could be viewed as a "substantial governmental interest,'
which would suffice for the kind of commercial speech regulated in the federal highway statutes and
P
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regulations. However, regulating political speech requires compelling governmental interest, not
substantial interest. Aesthetics and traffic safety are not compelling state interests sufficient to justify
a content-based restriction on highly protected political speech. Further, the NAACP boycott and
informationhest-area activity, like EURO's rest-area activity, implicate not only political speech but
associational M o m . Even by itself, associational fieedom is a First-Amendment fieedom that that
can only be regulated for compelling governmental interest Dallas v. Stanglin n137; see also City

of Chicago v. Morales. n138 Added to the protections afforded to political speech, the protections
afforded political associational fieedom absolutely require compelling governmental interest to
regulate.
3. Further, South Carolina's attempts to enlistjudicial action through declaratoryjudgment

to restrict all controversial, thus including allpolitical, speech in the information/restarea. Such
broad restrictions are unconstitutional and fail narrow tailoring.
In a case persuasive on the unconstitutionalityof broad speech restrictions for areas attached
to highways, Faustin v. Denver, n139 the district court examined whether Denver could 'consistently
and uniformly prohibit all speech activities on all highway overpass walkways throughout Denver,
regardless of the content of the message." Because the ordinance vested too much discretion in
government officials and failed to articulate standards of enforcement, the district court voided the
ordinance as unconstitutional for vagueness.
In fact, because the relationship between South Carolina's request for permitting,
interpretation of federal highway law, and its banning of all political speech and association in the
information/rest areas are so tenuous, a court might easily view South Carolina's complaint as
pretextual because racist. See Creek (in which Posner argued that Westhaven's requirement of a
permit before development by an African American was disingenuous and racist). n140

.?
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In ahighly related case, tying together overbreadth and associational M o m Ciiy of Chicago
v. Morales, n141 the Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity of a broadly written city

ordinance that encompassed a great deal of harmless behavior and hampered First-Amendmentprotected freedom of association, even without a political-speech or political-association component.

In that case, the Court had reviewed whether an ordinance that permitted any officer to order to
disperse any person he reasonably believed to be a gang member loitering in a public place if the
loiterer's purpose was not apparent to the officer. As the Court indicated, the freedom to loiter is part
of "liberty." 11142 Further, because the ordinance failed to give the ordinary citizen notice when he
committed the forbidden rather than the permitted, the ordinancewas impermissibly vague and lacked
sufficient minimal standards to guide law-enforcement officers, including any standard by which
police could judge whether an individual had an apparent purpose. Thus, the Chicago ordinance
delegated too much discretion to the police in every application and was constitutionally void for
overbreadth. Further, the Court examined whether the ordinance hampered the First-Amendment
freedom of assembly of non-gang members and criminalized status rather than conduct. n143
In Morales, the ordinance even appeared to have had a positive effect on safety because the
gang-related homicide rate dropped 26% after its passage. Thus, the ordinance apparently served an
arguably compelling governmental interest. But the Court voided the law because it inhibited the
exercise of First-Amendment rights because the impermissible applications of the law were
substantial when "judged in relation to the statute's legitimate sweep." Broadrickv. Oklahoma. n144
Further, the Court pointed that it could also void a law, even if it did not reach a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct, if its impermissible vagueness failed to establish standards for the
police and public sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests. Kolender v.
Lawson. n145 In fact, the Court compared the Chicago ordinance as indistinguishable from the law
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held invalid in Shuttlesworth. 11146 Because the constitutional sins of the sweeping ordinance were
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too great and Chicago had many reasonable alternatives to combat the "very real threat posed by gang
intimidation and violence," the Court struck down the ordinance. 11147

Morales has implicated only one First-Amendment principle, associational fteedom in the
non-political context. On the other hand, South Carolina attempts to restrict broadly threefederal and

three state First-Amendment freedoms, i.e., the NAACP's and EURO's political speech and political
associational activities in support of petitioning South Carolina. South Carolina breathtakingly fails
narrow tailoring. The Court struck the Morales' ordinance for vagueness, for permitting unfettered
discretion by police (and other officials). The South Carolina sign in theinformationfareaspecifically
prohibits meetings or other 'group" activities and commercial use. While traffic safety may permit
prohibiting commercial speech (the type that the federal statute carelfly outlines and for which it
provides procedural safeguards), no such guidelines appear for prohibiting othef First-Amendment
fteedoms requiring stronger scrutiny. The complaint attempts to disperse completely brown people
(and whites there to argue with their points), vocally but peacefilly "loitering," without g u i d e l i i for
when such dispersal may occur, i.e., without notice. Even setting aside certain areas where such
expressive conduct and political speech may occur has not been tried, nor has setting aside certain
spaces or times at particular areas.
The lack of such narrower restrictions on First-Amendment rights demonstrate that South
Carolina has not failed to tailor narrowly. Rather, the state has blatantly tried to sweep FirstAmendment embarrassment under an unconstitutional rug. The casual observer might wonder if,
whenever a brown face appeared, South Carolina might feel the need to disperse picnickers, those in
quiet but political discussion, or those brown people who "loitered" in great enough numbers to
'intimidate" or cause "controversy." Patently, South Carolina's efforts to keep brown people and their

?
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political opponents out of the information/rest areas are all too similar to the anti-gang ordinance in
Morales, saved from brutally obvious racism by the happy inclusion of the EURO speakers and

associates.

Whether or not ample alternative means of political, associational, or petition freedom exist
for the NAACP, to assess the final Clark prong, South Carolina has already opened one designated
forum for EURO that the NAACP has yet to enjoy, i.e., the flagpole on the South Carolina statehouse.

Other southern states, i.e., Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, having opened designated public fora
similarly,may examine whether the NAACP may be restricted fiom the use of such designated fora in
their states. The NAACP should continue to exercise its well-founded First-Amendment right to
boycott, assemble, and petition every southern state with a designated forum for the Confederate flag
and also petition for the southern flying of the Black Power and rainbow flags. Plainly, South
Carolina has not demonstrated a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the
constitutional injury South Carolina has already imposed on theNAACP by its broad effort to restrict
three federal and three state First-Amendment freedoms.
4. South Carolina may not charge the NAACP or EURO for the state b law-enforcement
assignments.

Policing is a police power of the state, and its funding is a state, not individual, responsibility.
Because 'rights of political association are fragile enough," Claiborne limits derivative liability to
protect fieedom of association and prohibits adding "the additional threat of destruction by lawsuit."
11148 In Morales, 11149 the Supreme Court cemented the notion that guilt by association is not a
constitutionally valid doctrine. Thus, South Carolina may not impose associational liability on the
NAACP or its members, especially for exercising constitutionally protected rights, by charging them
for police protection the state chooses to provide. South Carolina may not destroy the NAACP

economically in retaliation for the NAACP's First-Amendment-protectedeconomicboycott of South
O
I

Carolina

5. Trafic safety interloch with inforrnation-sharing. Indeed, contrary to South Carolina's
complaint, Congress viewed these interests as coordinating and placed both purposes in federal
statutes..
As noted earlier, a rousing political debate is just the tonic for highway hypnosis.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the NAACP's and EURO's first-Amendment expressive
activities imperil traffic safety, even the decrease in homicide rate could not save Morales' ordiiance
from being voided because it caused constitutional injury to the brown and other people whose
associational W o m it restricted. Even a genuine, proven rather than speculative, increase in traffic
accidents cannot save South Carolina's broad infringement on NAACP's associational, speech, and
petition freedoms.
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